

second aspect of the political is thus "the more prosaic moment of the endless process of decisioning" (p. 136). Edkins quite convincingly argues that the poststructural concepts of subjectivity and ideology can contribute to the investigation of such political moments.

Paolini's volume, which is less sharp and so a more difficult read, also tackles questions of politics, subjectivity, and agency, specifically with respect to postcoloniality and the possibility of resistance to domination. As does Edkins, Paolini offers a widely ranging criticism of IR, especially its statism and the fact that it is "excessively Western in sensibility and orientation" (p. 30). But Paolini is more skeptical than Edkins about the usefulness of a postmodern reading of the Third World and of postcoloniality. He recognizes that such an approach is in many ways "apt and useful" (p. 98), but he also notes that it needs ridding of "the Western baggage that accompanies [it] into the postcolonial" (p. 98), including problems with its notion of identity. He argues that a postmodern reading imports Western disillusionment inappropriately to the Third World, where there might instead be attractions to modernity (pp. 98-9); that it homogenizes and flattens the Third World and its heterogeneity (pp. 100-1); and that its notions of subjectivity, agency, and resistance actually undermine prospects for agency and thus for resistance (pp. 101-2). The poststructural dichotomy of essentialism versus death of the subject, he argues, in fact disempowers people who are just finally finding a voice. As Paolini points out, "the balancing between a postmodern reading and the need to carve out a space for enabling action on the part of postcolonial subjects is an inherently awkward one" (p. 58). His analysis thus questions Edkins's claim that poststructuralism easily offers a political strategy, and Paolini provides a more nuanced and critical analysis of the relationship of postmodernism to agency.

Despite their merits, these volumes have limitations. Both, for example, reproduce the contemporary imbalance between theory and analysis in IR. I repeatedly found myself asking: Where is the stuff of world politics? With the exception of a few examples—much too few and much too sketchy—there is no empirical material in *Poststructuralism in International Relations* (in fairness to Edkins, she has carried out such research elsewhere). Although the book is undoubtedly useful to IR scholars and students, it is not actually about world politics at all and could more appropriately have been called "Poststructuralism and the Political." *Navigating Modernity* suffers from a similar weakness. Paolini repeatedly promises us that the abstract investigation of postcolonialism and identity will be applied to Africa, but the empirical analysis recedes like a mirage as we advance through the book. It resolves in the end into a tiny oasis, made up of little more than a few anecdotes and vignettes derived from others' writings. In both volumes, the empirical material is too little and comes too late to be convincing. From Edkins I wished for some extended examples to show how these wonderfully elucidated theoretical concepts might help me with concrete problems of world politics. From Paolini I wished for the theory to be pulled together, as promised, in the African case.

Each volume also has at least one major theoretical drawback. Although Edkins recognizes that the political includes both the founding moment of a social totality and the more prosaic moment of decisioning, she neglects the latter in favor of the former. That is, she formally recognizes (e.g., p. 128) but practically ignores the political nature of the constant reproduction of and resistance to elements of the social order. In the end, and I am sure it is not what she intended, her defense of the utility of poststructuralism actually seems to limit what poststructuralism can contribute

to political and international analysis. She wants it to encompass the political defined broadly as all constitutive moments and exercises of power, but she really focuses on and seems to privilege the narrower notion. I would argue that poststructuralism is more widely useful than this book implies.

Similarly, while I sympathize with Paolini's emphasis on subjectivity and identity, I am increasingly uncomfortable with the tendency in some poststructural analysis to substitute these concepts for material structures of oppression associated with race, class, and gender. Although Paolini mentions materialist critiques of postcolonialism's culturalism, he effectively dismisses these interventions as subject to the danger of "excessive structuralism" (p. 119). Ironically, this has the effect of displacing the everyday experience of gender oppression, for example, with analysis only of the discursive construction of subjectivity. Something is lost in that translation.

Despite these shortcomings, each volume more than lives up to the promise of the Lynne Rienner series to offer critical perspective on world politics. Both are excellent teaching tools for graduate and perhaps even undergraduate courses. Edkins offers an outstanding introduction to some of the central ideas of poststructuralism; Paolini offers a useful introduction, among other things, to the concept of postcoloniality and the relationship of globalization to the Third World. These volumes, in short, are useful in complementary ways: Edkins provides a crisp exposition of several important theoretical arguments; Paolini's detailed analysis makes possible a sophisticated integration of the Third World into IR, and hence enables an IR worthy of the name.

**Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace.** By Kurt Taylor Gaubatz. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. 208p. \$45.00.

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Kurt Gaubatz explores the relations among public opinion, electoral politics, and peace and war decisions in democratic states. The study is an outgrowth of the author's doctoral dissertation, but it reads like a coherent and mature book and does not have the standard and technical features often associated with doctoral theses. Gaubatz's starting point is that, despite the large body of literature on the democratic peace phenomenon, there is a "surprising lack of effective work drawing connections between the internal political processes of democratic states and [war and peace] outcomes at the international level" (p. 3). Accordingly, this book explores how democratic politics work to affect national security issues.

The author develops a framework that envisions three major domestic inputs to foreign policy choices: government leaders, opposition elites, and mass publics. The structure and workings of domestic institutions mediate the link between these inputs and foreign policy choices. The focus is on the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy outcomes, but the framework also discusses how foreign governments and the choices of the democratic state interact to produce international outcomes.

The book is organized around this framework, and each chapter focuses on one of its elements. Gaubatz starts by discussing various notions about the relations among public attitudes, elite attitudes, and peace and war decisions. He first dismisses the realist notion that domestic processes have little or no effect on peace and war decisions. At the same time, he discounts naive notions about the "nature" of

democratic publics. His argument, which he labels "protean public," is that democratic publics are neither inherently pacifist nor easily swayed by inflammatory rhetoric. They respond to international events and to their own leaders, and at the same time their attitudes have an effect on leaders' choices.

Leaders interact not only with the mass public in general but also with opposition elites. This interaction sometimes produces outcomes that are opposed to leaders' own preferences with regard to foreign policy. In some cases, leaders who opt for war may refrain from it, even if a small but significant public minority opposes it. Gaubatz's analysis of public opinion and leaders' preferences during the interwar years in Europe, the United States, and Canada provide interesting illustrations of these arguments. The three nineteenth-century cases in which democratic publics displayed prowar attitudes (the Crimean War, the Boer War, and the Spanish-American War) are less convincing. Gaubatz does not succeed in documenting whether leaders entered these wars because of public pressures or because public pressures coincided with leaders' preferences for war.

Gaubatz focuses on elections and electoral politics to analyze the influence of democratic institutions on foreign policy choices. He examines these politics in terms of "election cycles," that is, the potential relationship between the distance from the last election and the proximity to the next election and conflict decisions. Using both the militarized interstate dispute (MID) and interstate war data, he tests for the effect of election cycles in dispute and war behavior. The most significant finding is that "democratic states have entered significantly more wars in the early stages of their electoral cycles and significantly fewer wars in the latter stages" (p. 142).

The general conclusions of the study suggest that democratic politics make a difference in peace and war decisions, but their workings are more complex than presumed by various theoretical approaches. Realist notions of international behavior, other naive notions about pacifist or militant publics, and simple-minded election cycle effects do not seem to account for the nature or the scope of the linkages between democratic politics and war. Gaubatz advocates a contingent approach that takes into account not only the changing moods about wars within democratic publics but also—and this is an important contribution—the ways in which the transparency of democratic politics affects actual and potential opponents. Overall, Gaubatz cautions against sweeping generalizations about democratic politics and war, but he argues that certain limited, although relatively robust, patterns do exist.

The book makes several important contributions to knowledge about democratic politics and war. It offers an interesting framework for studying these relationships. Some may object to certain elements of this framework, but overall it is a good starting point from which one may develop theoretical propositions. It also serves as a primary guide for empirical research. Gaubatz is not wedded to his framework and is willing to reassess some of its elements (e.g., the discussion on the effect of democratic politics on opponents of democracies, pp. 122-4). The book covers a relatively large array of cases, which are generally insightful and well documented. Gaubatz offers a balanced argument about democratic politics and war that rejects naive views of such politics, on the one hand, or a dismissive perspective of democratic effects on foreign policy, on the other. Finally, the book is well written, and the arguments and empirical discussions—especially the historical case studies—flow smoothly and convincingly. This makes the volume potentially appealing to both practitioners

and the educated public beyond the specialized scholarly community of political scientists.

The book has some weaknesses. Perhaps the chief among them is methodological. The choice of cases appears fairly arbitrary, although the cases themselves are quite interesting. For example, virtually all involve conflicts between democracies and nondemocratic states (or against rebels in a colonial setting), whereas proponents of the democratic peace proposition often argue that democratic politics matter most (or exclusively) when democracies confront one another. There is no clear structure to the case studies themselves. Each is conducted in relatively free form, although it is set to confirm or disconfirm a theoretical argument. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis is problematic in certain respects. The most important problem concerns the failure to control for other internal or international factors often mentioned in the literature as facilitators or inhibitors of conflict and war behavior. In addition, the failure to consider "opportunities" for conflict makes the interpretation of the findings on election cycles and conflict behavior tenuous due to potential selection bias.

Despite these critical aspects, the balance is quite positive. This is an interesting and insightful start on a very important subject. It will make a very useful addition to the burgeoning literature on the relationship between domestic and international processes.

**At Arm's Length: The European Union and Europe's Defence Industry.** By Terrence R. Guay. New York: St. Martin's, 1998. 219p. \$59.95.

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The author sets out to provide a theoretically grounded explanation of the development of European Union (EU) influence over defense industry policy. His core argument is that, despite clear limits, this influence has grown significantly since the end of the Cold War. He employs a "reactive spillover" approach to explain such developments. This displays several obvious similarities with neofunctionalism—a theory of integration that has been around for half a century. First, it "accepts that sub- and supra-state actors are the main agents of integration" (known in neofunctionalist jargon as political and cultivated spillover, respectively). Second, reactive spillover uses the concept of "functional spillover" to explain how integration spreads from one functional sector to another: "Economic integration in other sectors has pulled in (or spilled over into) the defense sector" (p. 179). In addition, however, reactive spillover stresses the role of the international environment—both the changes under way in the international economy and more political factors, such as the end of the Cold War—in determining the pace and scope of spillover in this policy sector.

The book is well researched and provides a host of interesting empirical information concerning the changes that have occurred in European defense industries since the early 1990s. The arguments presented in chapter 2—that shifts in the global economy and the tremendously rapid consolidation of the American defense industry that accompanied it necessitate fundamental changes in the European defense industry—are compelling. More generally, it is refreshing to see the relationship between European integration and defense issues being treated at all in a book-length study, as security issues in general are often ignored by students of European integration.

The book is flawed in several ways. First, it is far from clear that the author marshals sufficient empirical evidence to