

Elite-led reform dominates the earlier cases. Two varieties are identified: middle-sector democratization with little working-class interest and electoral support mobilization seeking preemptive recruitment of working-class support. With the growth of social democratic parties emphasis shifts to joint projects between elites and mass-based workers' movements to broaden participation. Democratization at the end of the twentieth century, characterized by transitions from authoritarian regimes, shows a range

of more complex patterns, with labour participation ranging from very significant in the destabilization/extrication pattern (Spain 1977) to unimportant in the inter-elite game (Greece 1974). Overall the conclusions favour neither extreme position, emphasizing multiple paths of transition and parallel interactions between elite and mass organization. Both the breadth of its subject matter and the subtlety with which its conclusions are drawn make this a significant and interesting contribution to the literature.

**ELECTIONS AND WAR:  
the electoral incentive in the  
democratic war and peace**  
by Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

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*Readership:* Academic/research,  
advanced undergraduates,  
postgraduates.

*Rating:* \*\*\*\*\*

Reviewer: STANLEY HOFFMANN  
(Harvard University)

This volume does not deal with the so-called democratic peace (the assumption that democracies don't fight each other) but with the effects of domestic politics, and especially elections, on the proneness of democracies to go to war. The author distinguishes between their leaders, the opposition elites and the mass public. He concludes, *contra* Realism, that the attitudes of the public and the institutions of democracies do make a difference in international affairs, and that the historical record supports what he calls the

'sophisticated liberal perspective'. The coming of elections dampens bellicosity, because of an increase in public influence – not because the public is always anti-war, but because its jingoism is tempered by elite views, and only in the short-term: after the election, the logic of international anarchy tends to reassess itself. And the author points out that going to war early may at times be necessary: delays are not always wise (a study of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 would have been illuminating in this connection). As the author argues at the end, democracy is 'rightly revered', but also prone to various pathologies, including 'vast errors of judgement'.

The author makes good use of theory, considers a wide variety of cases, from ancient Greece to the present, and he writes clearly. This is a careful study that does not squeeze data into the straight-jacket of pre-cooked hypotheses and contributes in an important way to our understanding of the interaction between domestic and foreign policy, and especially of the influence of the former on the latter.