

Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace. By Kurt Taylor Gaubatz. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. Pp. 208. \$45.00.)

While many have surmised on the use of force and its relationship to democratic elections, few studies have examined this issue with serious depth or scope. At the same time, many unanswered questions remain regarding the linkage between democratic states and war propensity. Kurt Gaubatz's book considers these issues and, in doing so, adds substantially to the understanding of the relationship between elections and war.

Gaubatz's foremost purpose is to examine whether there is any impact of elections on democratic states' willingness to enter or initiate wars. Using both case studies and statistical comparisons of democratic states, elections and war frequency, Gaubatz provides a number of important findings. The author begins by examining the claim that democratic societies are inherently peaceful and that the "culture" of democracy prevents war. He shows that democratic publics can in fact be vigorous proponents of war, much more so than their democratically elected leaders, for instance, the American public prior to the Spanish-American War and the British public prior to the Boer War. However, Gaubatz argues, because there are political pressures on democratic leaders not to appear as a "war-monger" to the public, strong incentives exist not to enter war prior to an election. In such societies, antiwar minorities can have a strong influence on a leader's decision to protract entry into war until elections have been held.

At other times, democratic societies may be unwilling to enter wars even though their leaders may want to prepare for, or even enter, war, such as Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom prior to World War II. Even in light of threatening fascist governments, democracies may be adamantly opposed to war. In these cases, politicians recognize their limitations and reflect these attitudes in their political campaigns. Thus, Gaubatz concludes, democratic societies exhibit different tendencies at different times on war, making it very difficult to generalize about democratic cultural attitudes regarding war and peace.

Gaubatz continues by examining a wider scope of cases. Using data from the Wages of War dataset from the Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social Research, Michael Doyle's categorization of democratic states, and his own research on elections, Gaubatz finds that democracies are much less likely to initiate or to enter war as elections draw closer. The author breaks election/governing cycles into five periods, or "quintiles," and provides convincing data that in the quintile nearest an election, democratic states are much less likely to initiate or enter war. Moreover, in the first quintile after an election—when the next election is at its farthest point—wars are initiated and entered with much higher frequency. He also finds that "serious" wars, which involved more than a thousand battle deaths, were not initiated in the year prior to an election (129).

Gaubatz's findings provide important insights and challenges to previous research. He maintains that contrary to the expectation of realists, democratic

elections do have an impact on a state's foreign policy behavior. He demonstrates an apparent relationship between the timing of an election and democratic foreign policy making. He also establishes that democracies are not inherently pacific. In fact, democratic governments may be prone to war if effective demagoguery exists and if the public's desire to battle is exploited by entrepreneurial politicians. Thus, the author notes that democracies sometimes have faults, and he appropriately closes with a quote from Winston Churchill: "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time" (159).

One question that goes unanswered is an explanation for why there were still some, although quite infrequent, cases of democracies that waged war in the last quintile prior to an election. An examination of these cases would provide another opportunity to study why democratic states enter wars and if some linkage to electoral politics does exist, albeit in only a small number of cases. However, this question goes beyond the scope of Gaubatz's study and does not detract from the merits of his findings. In sum, the study makes a significant contribution to studies of democracy and war—with data that are quite convincing and impressively utilized. The book is well written and thus should be accessible to a wide readership.

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Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union. By Matthew J. Gabel. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998. Pp. 180. \$47.50.)

This book provides a sophisticated empirical analysis of a crucial question in the study of the European Union (EU)—the sources and structure of public support for European integration. It is, at the same time, a breath of fresh air in a subfield of the discipline in which the proliferation of jargon is often a substitute for good social science.

The question of public support has always weighed heavily on the minds of both political leaders and scholars. It was supposed (and hoped) that the functional accomplishments of European integration would—sooner or later—be translated into a shift in the affective political orientations of mass opinion. In other words, if European integration delivered specific benefits, then the French and the Germans (for example) would increasingly become attached to a general European identity. Perhaps as a result of wishful thinking many believed that such a transformation was under way by the late 1980s. The crisis of the Maastricht Treaty and struggle to ratify it, therefore, came as quite a shock. This book shows exactly why European public opinion was misunderstood.

Gabel begins by rehearsing the Eastonian model of public support for governing institutions. Citizens may have an affective allegiance that is stable and swamps other, narrower considerations, and/or a utilitarian appraisal of government that is driven by self-interest and tends to vary based on estimates of per-