

## **POLITICAL COMPETITION AND FOREIGN POLICY POWER SHARING**

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In this essay I examine the intersection of domestic and international politics in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. I develop a three-actor model that allows us to specify the incentives for power sharing under different assumptions about the distribution of preferences and capabilities between a government, a domestic opposition, and a foreign state. The model generates several interesting hypotheses about the interaction of policy goals and the willingness of actors to share power. In particular, I show that under certain conditions there are important asymmetries whereby doves may be more willing to share power than hawks. Importantly, this willingness is endogenous to the model and comes from the alignment of preferences in the policy space, rather than from an *a priori* value for the democratization of foreign policy making. The model also suggests several hypotheses about the circumstances under which states have incentives to meddle in the foreign policy processes of other states.

*KEY WORDS: foreign policy, domestic sources of foreign policy, two-level games, strategic politicians, strategic interaction, power sharing*

### **EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY POWER SHARING**

The idea that “politics stops at the waters’ edge” cannot be sustained on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Theoretically, it is not clear why strategic politicians should avoid foreign policy as an arena of competition

for political power. The dominant model of politicians as election maximizers suggests that they should seek any advantages they can find over electoral adversaries (Mayhew, 1974). Empirically, it is clear that politicians often invoke international themes in their internal competition for power (Aldrich *et al.*, 1989). And yet, the notion that foreign policy should not be a domain of political competition is still frequently invoked. In fact, politics does sometimes stop at the waters edge, and sometimes the fight over foreign policy is as intense as any fight over tax or welfare policy.<sup>1</sup> In this article, I present a model of the intersection of domestic and international politics that can help us specify the conditions under which domestic political actors will compete over foreign policy powers and the conditions under which they will be willing to share power.

There is a rapidly growing literature on the intersection of domestic and international politics. Much of this literature has emerged from the interest in the possibility of distinctively pacific relations between democratic states (see Russett, 1990, 1993; Ray, 1995; Brown *et al.*, 1996; Elman, 1997). There is also, however, a growing interest in specifying more generally the relationship between domestic and international political activity. This literature can be broadly divided into two basic approaches. In the two-level games literature, international outcomes are dependent on a domestic ratification process. An agenda setter, such as the President chooses policies that then must be accepted by a ratifier such as the Congress (see e.g., Putnam, 1988; Evans *et al.*, 1993; Milner, 1997). This approach takes the apportionment of foreign policy powers within the state as a given.

A second approach can be found in the strategic politicians literature (see e.g., Siverson, 1998). This approach focuses on the external effects of the domestic competition for political power. Politicians have a nearly lexical preference for gaining and holding onto political power (Siverson, 1998, p. 3). Thus, there will be contestation over foreign policy wherever the actors perceive some domestic advantage to be gained. Under this approach, competition for power is constant and most models tend to be of the winner-take-all variety.

Neither the two-level games nor the strategic politicians approaches have made a significant effort to account for the variations in when power over the foreign policy process is the focus of domestic political competition, and when actors are willing to share foreign policy powers. Drawing on elements of both a two-level games model and of the strategic politicians literature, I develop here an explanation for power sharing in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. Using a simple spatial model that highlights the role of preferences and capabilities I show how incor-

porating the interaction of domestic and international politics can help explain a number of commonly observed behaviors as well as provide several counter-intuitive predictions about the sharing of power in the foreign policy process. The results of this effort point to the importance of models that integrate domestic and international politics. Purely domestic models of foreign policy making predict constant competition between domestic actors, and thus miss the international incentives for these actors to share power. Purely international models miss both the importance of domestic political competition in the formation and conduct of foreign policy and the changes in the behavior of international actors that come about because of the internal political competition within other states.

### THE MODEL

As in the two-level games literature (Putnam, 1988; Evans *et al.*, 1993), I assume that international outcomes emerge from the interplay of domestic and international politics. The power to determine international outcomes is shared among three actors. At the domestic level there is a domestic government and a domestic opposition. These two actors bargain over a single foreign policy. Foreign policy emerges from the preferences of the two actors weighted by their power shares. At the international level, a bargain is reached to compromise between the single foreign policy that emerges from domestic politics and the outcome preference of a foreign government. The international compromise is weighted by the relative power of the foreign government and the power of the domestic actors.

I further assume that the preferences of the actors over a specific foreign policy issue can be reasonably represented along a single dimension. Unidimensionality is, of course, a non-trivial assumption. It has been argued, for example, that there are multiple-dimensions to underlying foreign policy attitudes in the United States (Wittkopf and Kegley, 1982; Hinckley, 1988; Gaubatz, 1995). But, even where underlying attitudes are multi-dimensional, many significant issues are reduced to a single dimension in terms of policy: what degree of force to use, what level of tariffs to set, how much foreign aid to provide. The focus on a single dimension comes about either because of the inherent nature of the issue area, or because of the organization of the political system. While remaining aware of the limitations of single-dimensional analysis—an issue to which I will return at the end of this article—we can still make important analytic headway in this simplified framework. Laver and

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Budge, for example, have argued that European political parties are best modeled on a simple left-right continuum, despite the obvious multiplicity of issues and dimensions in that environment (Laver and Budge, 1992).

The assumptions can be summarized as follows:

1. Three unitary rational actors share power over outcomes. Two domestic actors—a government and an opposition—share power over the policy of one state. Their chosen policy interacts with the policy of a foreign state to produce an outcome.
2. The outcome space is unidimensional.
3. Policies and outcomes are continuous rather than discrete.

The three actors representing a government, its domestic opposition, and a foreign government have preferred outcomes in this single dimension continuous issue space. The preference points of these three actors will be notated with  $G$ ,  $D$ , and  $F$  respectively. There are six possible orderings of these preferences in the issue space:

$$1. F < D < G$$

$$2. D < F < G$$

$$3. F < G < D$$

$$4. G < D < F$$

$$5. G < F < D$$

$$6. D < G < F$$

Orderings 4, 5 and 6 are analytically equivalent, respectively, to orderings 1, 2, and 3 since they are mirror images. Thus, we can restrict the analysis to the first three cases in which the foreign government ( $F$ ) is to the left of the domestic government ( $G$ ).

The ultimate outcome will be a function of the relative power and policy preferences of the three actors. I will notate relative power with the lower case letters  $g$ ,  $d$ , and  $f$  for the government, the domestic opposition, and the foreign government respectively. The total power in the system is constrained such that  $g + d + f = 1$ . The outcome will be a simple linear combination of the power-weighted preferences:

$$\text{Outcome} = gG + dD + fF \quad (1)$$

Power is a relational characteristic of the actors—it describes their relative ability to influence an outcome. Substantively, we might want to think of a difference between the power to influence a policy choice—the primary area of competition between the government and the opposition—and the ability to influence an international outcome—the primary area of competition between states. This distinction is conceptually important, but is not required for the model. The outcome derived in equation 1 is analytically equivalent to the outcome that would emerge from a two-stage process wherein the two domestic actors arrive at a single policy, which then interacts with the foreign government's preferred policy.<sup>2</sup> There is also a conceptual advantage in treating the process in a single stage, in that it more directly illustrates the potential impact that opposition parties can have on international outcomes, and the interest that foreign states can take in domestic political battles.

The utility function of the actors over every possible outcome is assumed to be proportional to the distance from their most preferred point to the outcome. For analytic convenience I will constrain the outcome space to the [0, 1] interval. We can write a set of utility equations as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} U_f &= 1 - |F - outcome| \\ &= 1 - |F - dD - fF - gG| \\ &= 1 - |F(1 - f) - gG - dD| \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$$U_g = 1 - |G(1 - g) - dD - fF| \tag{3}$$

$$U_d = 1 - |D(1 - d) - gG - fF| \tag{4}$$

**Case 1:  $F < D < G$**

In this first case, the domestic opposition is in between the position of the foreign government and the position of the domestic government. This is a common scenario: a belligerent government with a conciliatory opposition or an isolationist government with an internationalist opposition are likely to fit this mold. For convenience, I scale the continuum so that  $F$  is at 0 and  $G$  is at 1. For now, I fix the foreign government's share of power over the outcome at  $f$ . This puts the focus on changes in the distribution of power over foreign policy between the domestic government and the domestic opposition. The model can now be recast as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} outcome &= g + dD \\ &= 1 - f - d(1 - D) \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_d &= 1 - |D - \text{outcome}| \\ &= 1 - |D - (1 - f - d(1 - D))| \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_g &= \text{outcome} \\ &= 1 - f - d(1 - D) \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_f &= 1 - \text{outcome} \\ &= f + d(1 - D) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

This quite simple model has a number of significant and interesting implications. Since  $(1 - D)$  is always positive, any increase in the power of the opposition relative to the government will decrease the utility of the domestic government and increase the utility of the foreign government. In this situation the domestic government will always resist any demands by the opposition to share foreign policy powers. Any cession of power from government to opposition pulls the outcome further from the government's preferred point and thus makes the government worse off. Similarly, to the degree that they can, foreign governments will consistently push to have the domestic opposition involved in foreign policy making.

The implications of this model for the domestic opposition are more interesting. There will be a critical point when the domestic opposition's preferred outcome  $D = 1 - f$ . If the domestic opposition's preferred outcome,  $D$ , is to the left of  $1 - f$  then the domestic opposition will want to have a share of influence over the outcome equal to  $(1 - f - D)/(1 - D)$ . This will leave the government with power of  $fD/(1 - D)$ . Of course, the government will resist opposition efforts to capture foreign policy power. But if the domestic opposition can capture exactly this amount of foreign policy power, it will be able to ensure that the outcome corresponds exactly to its preferences. Any share of power greater than this will actually *decrease* the domestic opposition's utility. Indeed, unless the opposition's preferred outcome is exactly the same as the foreign government's ( $D = F = 0$ ), the opposition will never want to take all foreign policy power away from the government. At the other end of the spectrum, if the preferred outcome of the opposition is to the right of  $1 - f$ , then the opposition will want to cede *all* control over foreign policy to the government. Figure 1 shows this dynamic.

Since the critical point at  $(1 - f)$  is determined by  $f$ , the more powerful the foreign government is in influencing the outcome, the greater the range

When the preference of the domestic opposition,  $D$ , is above  $(1-f)$ , the opposition will cede all power over foreign policy to the government. Below  $(1-f)$  it will seek a share of power equal to  $(1-f-D)/(1-D)$




Figure 1 Opposition preferences and the desire for power

in which the domestic opposition will be willing to cede power to the government. The less powerful the foreign government is in setting the outcome, the smaller will be the range in which the domestic opposition cooperates with the government. Hence, *ceteris paribus*, powerful countries should face relatively more pressure for the internal sharing of foreign policy powers than weaker countries when preferences are distributed with the domestic opposition between the foreign government and the domestic government. An increased external threat might similarly reflect a decrease in a state's ability to exert control over the international outcome, and thus would lead to a greater willingness of the opposition to cede power to the government. In such circumstances, politics is more likely to stop at the waters' edge.

Figure two, below, illustrates this dynamic comparing the domestic opposition's optimal power sharing arrangement for a given outcome preference ( $D$ ) when the power of the foreign government ( $f$ ) is .3 and when  $f = .6$ . The concave lines are the optimal power the opposition seeks as a function of its preferred policy ( $D$ ). The outcome lines in this figure indicate the outcomes that would obtain if the opposition succeeded in gaining the optimal foreign policy power. For domestic opposition preferences ( $D$ ) in the range from 0 to  $(1-f)$  the outcome under the opposition's optimal power sharing arrangement is exactly equal to the opposition's most preferred policy ( $D$ ). Above the  $(1-f)$  point, the opposition will have to accept  $(1-f)$  as the best that can be achieved.

The solid lines show the optimal power shares for the domestic opposition ( $d$ ) for different outcome preferences ( $D$ ) under two different assumptions about the relative power of the foreign state ( $f=.3, f=.6$ ). The dashed lines show the outcomes that will result if the domestic opposition succeeds in gaining its optimal power share.




Figure 2 Opposition Power Sharing Incentives

### Case 2: $D < F < C$

This is, perhaps, a more unusual case in which the foreign government is wedged between the government and its opposition. This might describe the situation for an arms control agreement where the two governments have an interest in maintaining some higher level of armaments than a more pacifistic domestic opposition favors, or perhaps a trade agreement with a strongly pro-free trade domestic government, a more weakly pro-free trade foreign government, and an anti-free trade domestic opposition.

I again rescale, this time to place  $D$  at 0 and  $G$  at 1. The model now looks as follows:

$$\text{outcome} = g + fF \quad (9)$$



$$\begin{aligned}
 U_f &= 1 - |F - \text{outcome}| \\
 &= 1 - |F(1-f) - g| \\
 &= 1 - |F - fF - g|
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{10}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 U_g &= \text{outcome} \\
 &= g + fF \\
 &= 1 - d - f(1 - F)
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{11}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 U_d &= 1 - \text{outcome} \\
 &= 1 - g - fF \\
 &= d + f(1 - F)
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{12}$$

With this alignment of preferences, the domestic opposition wants all of the power it can get at the expense of the domestic government, while the government remains adamant about limiting the power of the domestic opposition. These attitudes are irrespective of the existing distribution of foreign policy power and of the preference and power of the foreign government. There is not too much further to say about this distribution of preferences unless we drop the assumption that the power share of the foreign government is fixed.

With this distribution of preferences, simply increasing or decreasing the power of the foreign government has no effect on the contentiousness of political competition between the government and the opposition. In this case, politics is less likely to stop at the waters' edge.

The world envisioned by this model becomes more interesting if we allow for the possibility that the foreign government could somehow cede some of its power to either the domestic government or the domestic opposition. Like the domestic opposition in case 1, the foreign government, by virtue of occupying the middle position could face the possibility of being able to increase its utility by restricting its own power. Needless to say this possibility represents a radical departure from the standard analysis in international relations that would have states always striving for the maximum power in any two-state situation.

If changes in the distribution of power shares between all three actors are allowed, the middle actor will want to try to maintain a distribution of power between the actors at the extremes such that the outcome is as close as possible to the middle actor's preference point. Indeed, since the foreign government occupies the middle position, its own power is irrelevant as long as the relative powers of the domestic government and the domestic opposition are such that the foreign government's preference point is the

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outcome. If the foreign government has no power, this will happen as long as the domestic government's share of power is exactly equal to  $F$ . More generally, the foreign government will want the ratio of the domestic opposition's power to the domestic government's power to be  $(1 - F)/F$ . This suggests that the foreign government will have a strong incentive to meddle in the internal balance of power between the domestic government and the domestic opposition. Indeed, a given change in the balance of power between the domestic government and the domestic opposition will have a more significant impact on the utility of the foreign government than will an equivalent increase in its own share of power. Under these conditions, foreign governments are likely to be willing to sacrifice their own power if that sacrifice will effect a commensurate shift in the relative powers of the domestic government and the domestic opposition.

### Case 3: $F < G < D$

In this case the domestic government is closer to the foreign government than is the domestic opposition. Again, examples are not hard to come by: a free-trade government with a protectionist opposition, or a conciliatory government with a belligerent opposition are likely to display this arrangement of preferences.

Returning to the assumption that the power of the foreign government is fixed, this will lead to results similar to case 1, with the appropriate names changed. The scale is again reset to put the foreign government at 0 and the domestic opposition at 1. The model is now characterized as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{outcome} &= d + gG \\ &= 1 - f - g(1 - G) \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_g &= 1 - |G - \text{outcome}| \\ &= 1 - |G - (1 - f - g(1 - G))| \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_d &= \text{outcome} \\ &= 1 - f - g(1 - G) \end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_f &= 1 - \text{outcome} \\ &= f + g(1 - G) \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

Now, it is the government that may be in the position of trying to increase the foreign policy powers of the domestic opposition. The domestic opposition gladly takes power in this case, and will try to prevent

the government from exercising power itself. If the government's preferred outcome is above  $(1 - f)$  then the government will be willing to have its hands completely tied by the domestic opposition. Below that point, the government will attempt to hold onto power such that  $g = (1 - f - G)/(1 - G)$  and  $d = fG/(1 - G)$ . The opposition will always attempt to gain as much foreign policy power as possible, while the foreign government will attempt to deal only with the government and to freeze the opposition out of the process.

In case one, with the government more extreme than the opposition, the domestic opposition was more likely to push for a share of power when the power of the domestic state was high relative to the power of the foreign government. In this case it is the government that is in the middle position. The government will now be more likely to resist opposition claims for power when the domestic state is relatively more powerful and will be more likely to cede power to the opposition when the foreign government has relatively greater control over outcomes. This can be seen in figure two by switching the references to the domestic government and the domestic opposition. As in case one, an increased external threat will increase the willingness of domestic forces to cooperate in the foreign policy process.

Here, again, relaxing the assumption that the power of the foreign state is fixed has radical implications. The domestic government will seek to maintain the ratio of power between the domestic opposition and the foreign government at exactly  $(1 - D)/D$ . As in case 2, the middle actor may face incentives to cede power to the actor on the left rather than the actor on the right. In this case the domestic government will be tempted to collude with a foreign government to shift its own control over foreign policy outcomes to the foreign government at the expense of the domestic opposition.<sup>3</sup>

### IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE CASES

These three cases have, themselves, been rich in implications for the relationship between domestic politics and international relations. There are also two interesting implications to be drawn from a comparison of the three cases.

In the first place, this model predicts different pressures on the structures of foreign policy making depending on the foreign policy preferences of the principle actors. In a simple model of domestic political contestation all governments and oppositions will seek to maximize their own power, regardless of the substantive content of their preferences. In the model

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I have developed here, the domestic behavior of the actors changes because of the presence of the international dimension.

The nature of the changes in domestic behavior with the focus on the international component is easiest to see with an additional assumption about preference orderings. Assume for the purposes of discussion that there are hawks and doves competing for control over foreign policy and that both doves and the foreign government are to the left of the hawks. This seems the most likely case in reality, and is a common assumption in the literature (see e.g., Evans *et al.*, 1993, p. 399; Milner, 1997, p. 37). There are plausible cases in which hawks and the foreign government might find themselves with similar interests to the left of the doves. The 1980's debate in Europe over the emplacement of intermediate-range nuclear missiles often found more hawkish European governments in the middle between the United States which wanted larger numbers of missile deployments and dovish oppositions which wanted fewer missiles (Halverson, 1995).

With the assumption that the doves and foreign government are to the left of the hawks, the addition of an international component does not alter the behavior of the hawks. Whether they are in the government or in the opposition, hawks should always want to maximize their control over foreign policy. The doves are a different story. Whether in the government or in opposition, doves with foreign policy preferences relatively close to the hawks' position will have an incentive to defer completely to their more hawkish compatriots. As long as they are to the right of the preference of the foreign government, doves will have an incentive to share at least some foreign policy power with hawks. A domestic model, without an international component, would not be able to distinguish between the behavior of hawks and doves. It would predict that both doves and hawks would seek maximal control over the levers of power.

The degree of asymmetry in the behavior of the hawk and dove parties under these assumptions will always be a function of their relative policy preferences. It may be of particular interest to realists that in this model when the preferences of the dove party are between the preferences of the foreign government and the preferences of the hawks, the willingness to share foreign policy power will be a function of the *international* distribution of power. As we saw in cases one and three, above, the greater the relative international power of the state, the less willing doves will be to share control over foreign policy. More powerful states should have more contentious foreign policy politics.

A comparison of the three cases also speaks to the kinds of interests foreign governments will have in the distribution of domestic power in

other states. When facing a relatively unified state—i.e. one in which the domestic government and the domestic opposition are on the same side of the foreign government—the foreign government will want to see the power of the domestic actors closest to it increase relative to the domestic actors with policy preferences that are further away; but its primary goal will always be to maximize its own power over outcomes. If, however, the foreign government faces a state that is polarized, such that the preferred outcome of the foreign government is between the preferences of the domestic government and the domestic opposition, it may find itself more willing to sacrifice or expend some of its own power to alter the balance of power within the other state. The incentive to meddle in the domestic politics of other states is, then, a function of the distribution of policy preferences across the three actors.

Continuing for the purpose of illustration with the assumption that both the foreign government and the doves are to the left of the hawks, the hypotheses that have been generated by this model can be summarized as follows:

#### **The Relationship Between Hawks and Doves**

- H1: Hawks always want to maximize their own power.
- H2: Unless their position is to the left of the foreign government—that is the foreign government has preferences in between those of the doves and the hawks—doves will always be willing to share some degree of power with hawks.
- H3: Doves that are relatively close to the hawk position will be willing to completely cede their power to the hawks. This is true for a dovish government when  $G > (1 - f)$  and for a dovish opposition when  $D > (1 - f)$ .

#### **The Effect of Foreign Governments on Domestic Politics**

- H4: The stronger the foreign government, the greater the incentive for a dovish domestic opposition to cede power to a hawkish government.
  - H5: The stronger the foreign government, the greater the incentive for a dovish government to cede power to a hawkish domestic opposition.
  - H6: Dovish domestic governments are more likely to collude with foreign governments.
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### **The Incentives of Foreign Governments**

- H7: Foreign governments facing a relatively unified state will be most concerned about maximizing their own power.
- H8: Foreign governments facing a relatively unified state will always want to see the power of the dovish forces in the opposing state increased at the expense of the hawkish powers, but will not be willing to make one for one trades of their own power toward this end.<sup>4</sup>
- H9: A foreign government facing a relatively divided state—such that the preference of the foreign government is between the preferences of the domestic government and the domestic opposition—will be more interested in the balance of power between the domestic government and the domestic opposition than in maximizing its own power.

There are, then, a number of interesting implications generated from even a very simple model that considers the distribution of power in the foreign policy arena as a function of the preferences of both domestic and international actors, rather than purely as a matter of domestic political contestation. As usual, however, there are several important limitations to the model that must be remembered in moving from the modeling process to the real world.

### **LIMITATIONS AND COMPLICATIONS**

I set out this model with several critical assumptions, each of which is subject to question or qualification.

In the first place, this model relies on a restricted number of actors. The possible complications involved in increasing the number of actors is readily apparent if we imagine foreign policy involving relations with states on both the left and right of the outcome space. In the debate over intermediate range nuclear missiles, for example, the central East-West conflict of the Cold War was complicated by intra-alliance negotiations over the emplacement of missiles on European territory (Halverson, 1995).

Similarly, I have made foreign policy the focus of all political competition. This simplification abstracts away from the possibility that political parties and strategic politicians may compete for power for its own sake—that policy goals may be subordinated to electoral concerns. I have written elsewhere about the incentives for trade-offs between policy goals and political interests (Gaubatz, 1998, 1999). The focus on policy competition

has the effect of reducing the dimensionality of decision-making for the parties. While it is important to be aware of the importance of this simplification, for many issues it is both a common and reasonable assumption (Laver and Shepsle, 1996).

It may also be that foreign policy issues involve multiple rather than single dimensions. In this case the well-known problems of social choice will come into play in trying to determine how coalitions might form between the three actors. Domestically, as well, multi-dimensionality might lead to unstable coalitions and we would likely find politicians trying to increase public involvement in foreign policy-making when they believe they can forge a sufficiently long-lasting coalition to further their own particular policy goals (Gaubatz, 1995). As I argued above, the single dimensional approach is a reasonable starting place. Many of these effects will be preserved in a multi-dimensional environment,<sup>5</sup> but it is important to remain alert to the implications of multi-dimensionality. Nonetheless, many issues do reduce to a single policy dimension—either by their inherent nature, or by the organization of the political system (Laver and Budge, 1992).

The assumption that the outcome space is continuous is also subject to question for some issues and conditions. If the issue comes down to war or peace there can be no benefit to sharing power with political forces who might achieve a dichotomous outcome of this sort. A continuous policy space—such as the threat of force to gain concessions—will likely find some domestic actors who can increase their own utility by sharing power. But, if, for example, the doves favor peace while the hawkish powers are expected to provoke war, there will be no willingness by the doves to cede power to hawks.

## EXTENSIONS

The model I have presented here has been rich in implications despite its relative simplicity. In addition to addressing some of the limitations discussed above, there are also several directions in which the model might be extended to consider other effects. I will discuss here just a few of these possibilities.

In the first place, I have developed the model with a limited sense of domestic political competition. The actors here are competing over policy implementation, rather than over electoral outcomes. It is likely, of course, that there is some connection between policy and elections, but the strength of this connection could be varied within the model, rather than

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simply assumed. For example, the domestic political costs of power sharing could be relatively easily incorporated in the model.<sup>6</sup>

I have not allowed directly for the strategic misrepresentation of preferences. There may well be limits on how effectively a domestically constrained state can misrepresent its interests (See Schultz, 1996). Democratic states, in particular, have relatively transparent policy processes. The representation of one's preference point as more extreme than it really is may offer advantages in terms of the international outcome, but also runs the risk of alienating the median voter internally. Still, the model does offer some avenues for thinking about strategic behavior. In the first place, the cession of power may have a strategic element. Inviting farmers to the White House, making strong campaign commitments to special interest groups, appointing partisans to special commissions, and the like, may all be ways of temporarily sharing power on specific issues. Such actions may effectively misrepresent the nature of power in the domestic setting, rather than misrepresenting the underlying preferences of the actors.

Another ambitious extension would be to add the domestic opposition in the second state. This move would allow for considering the possibility of more cross-state coalitions and would be particularly interesting concerning the cooperation of opposition parties across states (see Knopf, 1993).

While these modeling extensions are important, it is also important to move towards empirical tests of the hypotheses generated by the current model. The data requirements for such testing are formidable, given the need to control for the many kinds of forces that would influence the processes described here, as well as the difficulty of measuring the central variables of this model. Nonetheless, the insights generated by the model and the need to further develop the theoretical base of domestic-international interactions suggest that such an effort will be worthwhile.

## CONCLUSION

I have presented a model that begins to delimit the strategic incentives for politicians to share power over foreign policy. The most immediate contribution of the model is to demonstrate the potential for looking at the interaction of domestic and international politics in thinking not only about international relations, but also in explaining domestic political dynamics. Neither the domestic politics of foreign policy nor the strategic behavior of international actors can be adequately understood without the incorporation of both the domestic and international realm.



The traditional view that politics stops at the waters' edge and thus that foreign policy is formed above the din of domestic politics is inadequate to this task. Purely international models will miss both the importance of domestic political competition and the changes in the behavior of international actors that come about precisely because of the internal political competition within other states. It is particularly important that in this model the changes in state behavior come about not solely because of their own internal politics—though that is obviously an important implication as well—but because of the interaction of their policies with the internal politics of other states.

The view of foreign policy as a simple extension of domestic politics is similarly inadequate. Purely domestic models of foreign policy making will predict constant competition between parties. With this simple three-actor model I show how the sharing of foreign policy powers is motivated by the intersection of domestic and international politics. In particular, this model suggests that the willingness of domestic actors to share power over foreign policy is a function of the *international* distribution of power. More powerful states will face greater internal competition over foreign policy issues.

The model also addresses the integration of ideas and institutions in political analysis. The results generated here are tied both to the institutions of foreign policy decision-making and to the preferences that different actors bring into those institutions. In particular, this model suggests that under some specified conditions there might be important differences in the willingness of hawks and doves to share power in the formation and conduct of foreign policy.

Much has been accomplished in the past two decades in thinking about the impact of democratic politics on international relations. In 1976 Small and Singer could reject the democratic peace hypothesis despite finding robust evidence for its existence and could then urge a turn of attention “away from rival domestic systems to the conflict-generating properties of the [international] system” (Small and Singer, 1976, p. 68). The potential for building models that cross the domestic-international divide is now more widely recognized (Evans *et al.*, 1993). The dynamics of power sharing in the foreign policy process is a promising area for the continuation of this rich research agenda.

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## NOTES

1. I restrict myself here to the consideration of competition over policy implementation and outcomes. I have written elsewhere of the willingness of strategic politicians to sacrifice their foreign policy goals for their electoral interests (Gaubatz, 1998, 1999).
2. The equivalence of the one and two-stage models is easily demonstrated. Let  $g'$  and  $d'$  be the relative power of the government and domestic opposition over the foreign policy process ( $g' + d' = 1$ ). Let  $S$  be the policy choice arrived at in the domestic policy process ( $S = g'G + d'D$ ). Let  $s$  be the relative power of the given state over the international outcome ( $s + f = 1$ ). Then at the international level  $outcome = sS + fF$ . This is the same as  $sg'G + sd'D + fF$ . So, letting  $g = sg'$  and  $d = sd'$  gives us:  $outcome = gG + dD + fF$ . *Q.E.D.*
3. This is similar to what the contributors to the Evans *et al.* 1993 volume call 'Chief of Government' (COG) Collusion.
4. To be precise, a change in the domestic balance of power has to be at least  $1/(1 - D)$  larger than the change in the power of the foreign government. A foreign government will be willing to expend or sacrifice some of its own power to change the balance of domestic power if and only if by expending or sacrificing  $w$  of its own power the foreign government can effect a  $w/(1 - D)$  or greater change in the domestic distribution of power.
5. McGillivray (1998) reproduces some of these effects in her consideration of the effects of governing structures on strategic political actors in a two-dimensional environment.
6. For a model that looks at the implication of the willingness of competing domestic actors to make trade-offs between the domestic and international sphere, See Gaubatz, 1998.

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