

KANT, DEMOCRACY, AND HISTORY

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In his essay "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" (1784), Immanuel Kant predicted that republican forms of government would eventually dominate the world. This, he wrote, was part of nature's "secret plan": The "cosmopolitan goal" of history was the general enlightenment of humanity and the universalization of republicanism as the basis of social organization.¹ Kant's prediction was a bold one. At the time, the number of democracies in the world could be counted twice on the fingers of one hand. His views have proved influential as well as prescient. Many of his ideas about the nature and causes of republican expansion have since been incorporated into the basic liberal creed. And while general enlightenment may still seem elusive, some scholars have suggested that we are currently in the midst of an extraordinary global movement toward democracy.²

Controversy remains, however, about both the scope and the sustainability of this so-called democratic revolution. Consider, for example, the contrast between two recent musings on the subject: Francis Fukuyama sees in the events of the past decade the harbingers of the "end of history"—the inevitable and conclusive victory of mass democracy as the dominant form of governance. Paul Kennedy, on the other hand, having examined population dynamics and historical cycles, foresees a gloomy and increasingly antidemocratic future for the world.³ At this moment of extreme uncertainty—or perhaps competing certainties—about the future of worldwide democratization, we would do well to reflect carefully on the dynamics of democratization that have brought us to this point.

This essay surveys the past two hundred years to provide an

empirical assessment of Kant's forecasts. More than simply an exercise in explicating Kant, it is an attempt to put into perspective the most recent wave of global democratic expansion and efforts to make the promotion of democracy a cornerstone of the foreign policy of democratic nations. From this broader historical point of view, worldwide democratization appears less inexorable than recent trends have led many to suppose, and the practical advantages of democratic governance that have frequently been touted in the post-Cold War era are less apparent.

Clearly, there are many different conceptions of democracy. Kant makes a distinction between republicanism, in which legislative and executive powers are separated, and pure democracy, which Kant feared might lead to despotism, with an executive claiming to represent the popular will. Whatever the label, Kant's argument that the true "civil state" requires representative institutions, the protection of individual rights, and the separation of legislative and executive powers clearly evokes the modern Western ideal of liberal democracy.⁴ In this essay, the terms "republican," "liberal," and "democratic" are used interchangeably to refer to political systems in which power is vested in representative institutions and individual rights are sufficiently protected to make those institutions effective. My classification of regimes as "democracies" draws on the work of Michael Doyle and on Freedom House's identification of "free" regimes in its annual "Comparative Survey of Freedom."⁵

Kant's Three Arguments

Kant's prediction of the expansion of republicanism relies on three different arguments: an argument from nature, an argument from practicality, and an argument from morality. The mechanisms of democratic expansion that these arguments outline have resurfaced in many contemporary accounts of the current global trend toward democracy.

The argument from nature. Kant maintains that humankind must regard its own development as one of nature's objectives. History, in his view, is governed initially by providence and then, with growing self-awareness, by humans themselves. Self-conscious management of human affairs is a necessary condition of humanity's moral growth. Such self-consciousness can be achieved only when people are free to govern themselves both individually and collectively. Collective self-government requires effective representative institutions. If the natural destiny of humankind is to be fulfilled, then, republicanism is a necessary feature of historical progress.

There is considerable debate about the degree of determinism implied in Kant's notion of a plan of nature. A minimum position is that Kant

holds that natural progress in human events cannot be seen as impossible. In fact, Kant went further than this, arguing not only that such progress cannot be ruled out (even in the absence of evidence) but that there is some evidence of that progress.

The argument from practicality. Republicanism, Kant asserts, is the most practical form of social organization for maximizing national power in the modern era. Industry and commerce require freedom for individual initiative and action. This freedom can be realized only when there is a representative body to constrain the executive powers of the state.⁶ Thus states that seek to maintain or increase their status in the international system should adopt republican forms of government. The economic advantage of democracy and its link to national power is made explicit in Kant's "Idea for a Universal History":

Civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades and industries, and especially to commerce, in the event of which the state's power in its external relations will also decline. But this freedom is gradually increasing. If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check.⁷

Democracy will expand internationally, then, as nondemocratic states observe and seek to replicate the success of the democratic states. This emulation will occur as a result of the dictates of international competition as well as the internal demands of citizens who observe the benefits enjoyed by inhabitants of democratic states.

The argument from morality. Kant is famous for his deontological approach to ethics, in which moral rules are binding in and of themselves rather than because of their consequences. Kant's "categorical imperative" refers to goals that must be pursued as ends in themselves rather than as means to other ends. Nonetheless, the argument from morality stands on both deontological and consequentialist legs. The deontological leg is the argument that states are obliged to pursue "rightly ordered" government for its own sake, regardless of the practical consequences. In other words, republican government is a categorical imperative. At the same time, however, republican government is a means of achieving other categorical imperatives—in particular, peace among nations. For Kant, the pursuit of peace is central to morality: "This task of establishing a universal and lasting peace is not just a part of the theory of right within the limits of pure reason, but its entire ultimate purpose."⁸ He argues that republican states are the most peaceable, both because they dethrone the absolutist rulers who have a vested interest in war and because they foster international commerce, which contributes to peace.⁹ To the degree that human beings pursue moral ends, then, republicanism will expand.

Table 1 — Number of Democracies, 1800–1980

Year	Number
1800	3
1850	8
1900	13
1945	29
1980	45

Source: Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 2, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Fall 1983): 351–52.

The Historical Record


In Kant's vision of progress, the forces of nature combine with the practical ends and moral obligations of humankind to produce an inexorable growth of republican forms of government. Kant is the first to admit, however, that progress is likely to come in fits and starts. Kenneth Waltz has described Kant's notion of historical purpose as "a universal plan of nature, unknowable in detail but dimly discernible in outline."¹⁰ Kant asks for relatively little from the historical record. In his "Idea for a Universal History," he characterizes his endeavor as "philosophical" rather than "empirical," driven by moral necessity rather than historical evidence. Nonetheless, he suggests that history has begun to reveal the general contours of the plan of nature.

Does the historical record of the two hundred years since Kant wrote in fact yield a dim outline of a "plan of nature"? Are the mechanisms Kant relies on to justify his predictions discernible? If we use the simple criterion of growth in the number of republican regimes, we cannot rule out such a plan. Looking at other parts of the picture, however, raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the Kantian mechanisms of democratic expansion.

Over the years, various scholars have undertaken empirical analyses of Kant's theory of democratic expansion. One relatively recent assessment is that of Michael Doyle.¹¹ Doyle found that between 1800 and 1980, the number of liberal states increased geometrically, roughly doubling every 50 years (see Table 1). His "extrapolation of nature's secret design" for the spread of republicanism seems to fulfill Kant's hopeful prediction "that the periods within which equal amounts of progress are made will become progressively shorter."¹²

It is important to remember, however, that the total number of countries in the world has increased significantly in the past two centuries. While the number of democracies has increased considerably, so has the number of nondemocracies. Placing Doyle's data in the


Figure 1
Number of Democracies and Nondemocracies, 1815–1995



Sources: For 1815–1985: Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 1, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer 1983): 209–12; and the Correlates of War Project, University of Michigan. For 1985–95: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1985 and subsequent years).

Note: Data are restricted to states with populations of more than one million.

Figure 2
Democracies as a Percentage of All States, 1815–1995



Sources: See Figure 1.

Note: Dashed line at 33 percent for reference.

context of the international system as a whole shows the expansion of democracy in a quite different light (see Figures 1 and 2).


The proportion of the world's countries that are democracies has clearly increased since the early 1800s; this is not surprising given the near absence of democratic states before 1776. Yet that increase is far less dramatic than the growth in the simple number of democracies. Democracies as a percentage of all countries held steady at between 25 and 30 percent from 1870 until the end of the First World War. Just after the war, the figure increased to almost 45 percent, but then steadily declined to about 25 percent by the beginning of the Second World War. Another dramatic increase occurred after that war, followed by a similar erosion to 25 percent by 1975. The most recent wave of democratization began about 1975; by 1995 the democratic share had reached a little over 30 percent—roughly the same as that immediately before the First World War. On the basis of this pattern, there is little reason to expect rapid and significant democratization in the near future.

Change in the simple number of democratic states, then, is obviously flawed as a measure of the advance of democracy. No one would argue, for example, that the breakup of the Philippines into several thousand democracies—one for each island—would herald a new democratic dawn. This has led some analysts to focus instead on the proportion of the world's population living in democracies. But this measure also fails to indicate a dramatic growth in freedom (see Figure 3 on page 142). In any case, the proportion of the world's people who live in democratic states is flawed as a measure of democratic growth, for it is highly sensitive to political shifts in a few very populous states. For example, sharp drops in the proportion of people living in free states occurred in 1976 and 1991 (see Figure 3). The cause of the former drop was India's brief experiment with martial law; the latter reflects Freedom House's decision to remove India from the list of fully free nations owing to intensifying political violence and widespread corruption.

An Alternative Measure

An alternative way to assess the status of democracy in the world is to consider change in the aggregate power of the liberal states. Since 1963, the Correlates of War Project at the University of Michigan has collected and analyzed numerical data in an effort to understand the sources of conflict within the international system. Part of its work has been the development of a now widely used measure of "national capabilities." This measure is based on a state's military personnel, military expenditures, energy usage, iron and steel production, total population, and urban population. This instrument does not capture some of the subtleties of power that may be particularly important for democratic states, such as the morale and training of fighting forces or

Figure 3
Population of Democratic States as a Percentage
of Total World Population, 1815–1995



Sources: Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 1, 209–12; the Correlates of War Project; Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*; and the *New World Almanac*.


Note: Dashed line at 50 percent for reference. "Total world population" refers to the areas identified as states by the Correlates of War Project.

the ability to transfer resources from economic to military uses.¹³ Nonetheless, it is a useful tool for assessing the practical benefits of democracy, particularly those that are most obvious to other states and hence likely to influence nondemocracies to emulate their democratic counterparts.

Another limitation of the Correlates of War measure is that the last year for which data are available is 1985—several years before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War has clearly brought about significant changes in the global balance of power. But the exact nature of these changes would be difficult to ascertain with any measure, given the enormous uncertainty surrounding recent developments in Russian economic and military policy. At any rate, since the present analysis deals with long-term trends, the uncertainties of the past decade need not overly concern us here.

For much of the period since England and France joined the democratic club in the 1830s, the aggregate power of the democratic states has been roughly the same as that of the nondemocratic states (see Figure 4). If we confine our view to the twentieth century, we see that, despite the dramatic increase in the number of democracies, the normal pattern of change in the democratic share of total capabilities has

Figure 4
Democratic Share of Total World Capabilities, 1815–1985



Sources: Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 1, 209–12; and the Correlates of War Project.

Note: Dashed line at 0.5 for reference.

been one of steady decline, punctuated by two dramatic increases corresponding with the two world wars.

Wars involving major powers, then, seem to be conducive to democratic expansion, although their beneficial effects are relatively short-lived. Ten new democracies emerged between 1914 and 1920. By 1940, seven of those had reverted to nondemocratic status. Between 1944 and 1952, 20 countries were added to the list of democratic states, only 12 of which have been democracies ever since. During times of peace among major powers, the balance of power has not strongly favored either democracies or nondemocracies. Overall, since 1870 the liberal states have lost power relative to the nonliberal states.

Kant recognized that war could be a force favorable to democratization. From a practical point of view, war would force states to maximize their effectiveness in raising revenues and armies—a goal to which democracy, in Kant's view, is most conducive. Moreover, war would be increasingly catastrophic in the modern world. The increased costliness of war and of preparations for war would intensify the desire for peace, which would in turn intensify the desire for democratic forms of social organization, which are associated with peace. These causes could be at work. Yet a little whittling with Occam's razor leads one to wonder about the simple effect of the democratic alliances' having beaten the nondemocracies in the two world wars. It seems less the "sad

experience of war" that has hastened cosmopolitanism than the changes in power that have accompanied military victories. That the two world wars had only short-term effects on the democratic share of power seems to support the simpler explanation. It has been observed that individual states that lose wars tend to make a phoenix-like return to power; the same phenomenon may operate at the aggregate level.

The empirical record remains ambiguous. Obviously, there are many more liberal states in the world today than there were two hundred years ago. When the increase in the total number of states is taken into account, however, the expansion of liberalism is considerably less striking than is suggested by the prophets of inexorable worldwide democratization. The picture becomes even murkier when we look at the relative power of the liberal and illiberal states. War seems to have had a beneficial effect on the democratic share of power, but whether that effect indicates a positive trend for world liberalism or merely a temporary stemming of the illiberal tides is open to debate. Regardless, this picture of the aggregate power of the liberal states poses significant difficulties for Kant's second argument for the expansion of republicanism: that practical benefits in terms of state power and status in the international system are among the fruits of a democratic regime.

Freedom and Power

The linchpin of Kant's predictions about the pattern of democratic growth is his assertion that freedom provides a competitive advantage. In this view, states will adopt republican forms of government out of a desire to maximize their own power. The relative success of democratic states will lead other states to emulate them. This view surfaces frequently in current discussions of democratization.

Evaluating the true effects of democratization on the capabilities of an individual state is difficult. It requires asking the following question: Is this state more or less powerful than it would have been with an alternative form of government? To answer this question accurately, we would need a sophisticated theory that addresses the various confounding factors that must be taken into consideration. Developing such a theory is, of course, an important task. Nonetheless, since the present analysis is concerned with the kinds of effects that would be readily perceived by other states, a relatively simple evaluation is sufficient here. The method of analysis used here is a simple comparison of the growth in relative capabilities of the democracies and the nondemocracies at the aggregate level, and of the experiences of individual states that have had both democratic and nondemocratic forms of government.

Between 1815 and 1985, 36 states experienced both democratic and nondemocratic rule. Of those, only 11 enjoyed a greater average annual increase in relative capabilities during their democratic years than during

Table 2 — Democratic vs. Nondemocratic Growth in Power, 1815–1985

Country	Nondemocratic Years		Democratic Years	
	Total Number of Years	Average Annual Growth in Relative Capabilities (%)	Total Number of Years	Average Annual Growth in Relative Capabilities (%)
Argentina	81	0.7	64	1.6
Brazil	140	1.7	20	2.7
Ecuador	109	-6.3	23	1.0
Estonia	7	-2.4	16	1.3
Holland	33	-2.9	133	-0.3
Japan	88	1.6	34	1.7
Latvia	10	0.1	13	1.4
Malaysia	6	0	23	2.5
Poland	45	0.8	17	1.9
Portugal	160	-0.4	10	0
Sri Lanka	7	0	31	0.5

Sources: See Figure 4.

their nondemocratic years. For each of these 11 states, Table 2 shows the number of years the state was a nondemocracy and a democracy, respectively, and the average annual rate of growth in relative capabilities for each experience.¹⁴

Few of these states would show up on a list of the great democratic success stories of the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Japan experienced only a slight improvement under democratic governance: 1.7 percent versus 1.6 percent. And the Dutch lost relative power more slowly in their 133 democratic years than they did in their 33 nondemocratic years. Overall, there is little here to suggest that other states would recognize the practical superiority of democracy and therefore seek to emulate the democratic states.

Kant recognized the difficulties and ambiguities involved in taking the individual state as the analytic unit. He argued that only in looking at change on the aggregate level could we begin to discern the murky patterns of history.¹⁵ Yet the aggregate record is no more positive. The average annual rate of growth in relative power is 1.9 percent for the nondemocracies, compared with -1.2 percent for the democracies. If liberalism does offer some practical benefit in terms of state power, that benefit is not sufficiently clear to show up in this test.

The Correlates of War measure is a basket of capability indicators covering population dynamics, economic strength, and military factors. For a number of years, economists and political scientists have tried to tease out the relationship between regime type and economic growth

with more sophisticated econometric analysis. By Kant's logic, this is the arena in which the practical advantages of democracy should be most apparent. Nonetheless, that effort has yielded similarly inconclusive results.¹⁶ At best, some economists using sophisticated statistical controls have discerned a slightly positive relationship between political freedom and economic growth. Since the Kantian mechanism depends on the material benefits of democracy being easily observed, those findings are insufficient to support Kant's argument from practicality.

Kant predicted that the expansion of republicanism would bring perpetual peace to a conflict-torn world. In his theory the moral importance of peace joins the basic forces of nature and the practical benefits of democratic social organization to drive republican expansion. Although the possibility of progress toward perpetual peace cannot be ruled out, history has not provided clear evidence of Kant's notion of a secret plan of nature. The argument from practicality relies on egotism—national competitiveness and the desire for power and status—to bring about worldwide democratization.¹⁷ But Kant's association of republicanism with practical benefits is problematic. The lackluster performance of democracy as a means to increased national power since 1870 may account for the limited expansion of democracy during this period. If nature and practicality are insufficient forces to usher in the new liberal dawn, then we are left with Kant's third basic argument: the moral argument.

Democracy and War

As discussed above, Kant's moral argument for the expansion of democracy is in part consequentialist and in part deontological. If democratic states are distinctively peaceable, then a deontological imperative of peace would imply a consequentialist argument for democracy as a means to that end. The theory that democratic states are more pacific than nondemocratic states has been widely rejected for most of the postwar period. The dominant theoretical approach in academic circles has been structural realism, which holds that the dangers inherent in international relations force all states to behave similarly, regardless of their individual characteristics. More recently there has been a revival of the notion that, at least with respect to one another, democratic states are distinctively peaceable.

If it is true that democracies tend not to fight one another, then Kant's moral argument for the expansion of democracy does seem plausible. If the pursuit of peace is a moral imperative, and peace is associated with democracy, then states are obliged not only to become democracies themselves but also to encourage democratization elsewhere. Indeed, democracy promotion for the sake of world peace has become an important element of U.S. foreign policy under the Clinton adminis-

tration. The moral argument, however, features a problematic paradox. Achieving world peace through the expansion of the "separate peace" of the union of democratic states entails growth in both the number and the power of democratic states relative to the number and power of nondemocratic states. History shows that democratic victory in war has been the most effective instrument for expanding the democratic sphere. Can the expansion of democracy be a moral imperative if this path to peace lies through war?¹⁸

In the end, we find ourselves in a quintessentially Kantian position. Humanity must take responsibility for its own moral advancement. Yet the foregoing analysis provides little solace to those who have shared Kant's hope that states would be forced into liberal social reorganization by the practical benefits of democracy in meeting the challenges of international competition. Even the argument that democracy would prove essential as a means to the moral goal of peace is weakened by the historical connection between democratization and war. Thus democracy may have to be pursued as a moral goal in and of itself, rather than as a means to an end. Kant offers the foundation for such an approach in his concept of the "civil" or "lawful" state. In "Perpetual Peace," he advises states as follows:

Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its *righteousness*, and your object (the blessing of perpetual peace) will be added unto you. . . . Whatever the physical consequences may be, the political maxims adopted must not be influenced by the prospect of any benefit or happiness which might accrue to the state if it followed them . . . they should be influenced only by the pure concept of rightful duty.¹⁹

To use Kant's famous terminology, the moral argument for the expansion of democracy is dependent on a philosophical approach that makes democracy itself a categorical imperative.

That republicanism has not advanced relentlessly over the past two centuries does not mean that it will not in the next two. Kant himself warns us of the folly of projecting observed trends into the future:

Even if it were found that the human race as a whole had been moving forward and progressing for an indefinitely long time, no-one could guarantee that its era of decline was not beginning at that very moment, by virtue of the physical character of our race. And conversely, if it is regressing and deteriorating at an accelerating pace, there are no grounds for giving up hope that we are just about to reach the turning point (*punctum flexus contrarii*) at which our affairs will take a turn for the better, by virtue of the moral character of our race.²⁰

The collapse of the Soviet empire may have opened a window of opportunity for democratization. If so, the force of recent trends may

reside more in new dynamics and perceptions than in the continuation of the dynamics of the past two centuries. It may be that democracy is increasingly bound up with state legitimacy. Another possibility is that the information age has created demands for individual freedom that the industrial age did not. State power may yet become hostage to the entrepreneurial spirit and the unhindered exchange of information. The practical benefits of democracy may then work to accelerate the pace of democratization. Former U.S. secretary of state George Shultz has dressed the Kantian logic in these modern clothes:

This new information age has the potential to be *our* age—a period which plays to the great strengths of the West. The productivity and competitiveness of a nation will be far more dependent on how freely knowledge can be used and shared. And unlike oil or mineral wealth, knowledge is a resource that does not diminish but, rather, increases with its use. In this sort of environment, open societies such as our own will thrive; closed societies will fall behind. What is more, this lesson—that freedom and openness are the wellspring of technological creativity and economic dynamism—is increasingly well understood throughout the world.²¹

Whether or not the practical benefits of democracy are more evident in the future than they have been in the past, the ultimate lesson Kant offers is that the moral duty to develop political institutions that can enhance individual freedom is independent of such benefits. The apparent failure of the industrial age to make democracy's competitive advantage obvious should serve as a warning to those who may place too much trust in the forces of nature and modernization to propel the expansion of democracy. Kant warns that we cannot actually observe the workings of providence in history. "*Modesty*," he says, "forbids us to speak of providence as something we can recognize."²² Such modesty should come naturally, for this analysis of the historical record suggests that "nature's secret design" remains just that.

NOTES

1. Kant's views on history and the growth of republicanism are discussed most directly in his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent." See also his "Contest of Faculties" and section 3 of "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice.'" The most relevant sections of all these writings can be found in *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). In "Idea for a Universal History" Kant states: "The otherwise praiseworthy detail in which each age now composes its history must naturally cause everyone concern as to how our remote descendants will manage to cope with the burden of history which we shall bequeath to them a few centuries from now. No doubt they will value the history of oldest times . . . only from the point of view of what interests them, i.e. the positive and negative achievements of nations and governments in relation to the cosmopolitan goal" (p. 53).

2. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (July 1996): 20–37.

3. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Random House, 1993).

4. See his "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in *Kant's Political Writings*, 100–102. For a discussion of the distinction between formal and liberal democracy, see Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?"

5. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986): 1151–69; Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1985 and subsequent years).

6. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 100–102. Kant does state that it is possible for an autocracy or an aristocracy to approximate "the spirit" of a representative system.

7. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 50.

8. Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. L.W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 174.

9. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 114; Pierre Hassner, "Immanuel Kant," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), 584–85.

10. Kenneth Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," *American Political Science Review* 56 (June 1962): 335.

11. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Parts 1 and 2, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer and Fall 1983): 205–35, 323–53; and "Liberalism and World Politics."

12. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 130.

13. See David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review* 86 (March 1992): 24–37.

14. It should be emphasized that what is being compared here is growth in *relative*—not absolute—capabilities. Using the absolute components of the relative-capabilities measure from the Correlates of War Project would not give appreciably different results. Disaggregating the composite measures is similarly inconsequential. Focusing on the two principal components of the capabilities score—iron and steel production and military expenditures—yields just 10 states with higher average increases in iron and steel production under democratic regimes than under nondemocratic regimes, and just 13 states with higher military-expenditure growth under democratic regimes. Including any state with higher average annual growth in *either* of these two specific areas or in relative capability would yield 13 more states: Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

15. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 52; Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," 335; Howard Williams, *Kant's Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 2.

16. Most of this work has focused on economic development as a cause of democratization rather than the other way around. See Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," *American Behavioral Scientist* 35 (March–June 1992): 450–99; and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (January 1996): 40. Some attempts have been made to examine directly the effects of democracy on economic growth. See, for example, Kevin Grier and Gordon Tullock, "An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 24 (September 1989): 259–75; and Abbas Pourgerami and Djeto Assane, "Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: New Measurement and Evidence on the Effect of Political Freedom," *Applied Economics* 24 (January 1992): 129–36.

17. Hassner, "Immanuel Kant," 575.

18. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have recently added to the problems of the consequentialist moral argument with their argument that the process of democratization creates instabilities that further increase the probability of war. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 5-38.

19. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 123-24. The concept of the "lawful state" can be found in Kant's essay "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice,'" in *Kant's Political Writings*, 73-87.

20. Kant, "The Contest of Faculties," in *Kant's Political Writings*, 180.

21. George Shultz, "Meeting America's Foreign Policy Challenges," *Current Policy* (U.S. Department of State), 20 February 1987.

22. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 108-9.